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A PACIFIC PERSPECTIVE

I

We have been an Atlantic - minded nation and understand ably so.

Fourteen of the states border the Atlantic .

of our ancestors reached America via the Atlantic .
follow religions of trans - Atlantic origin .
are learned in our schools are primarily
the Atlantic.

The majority

Most of us

The languages that

th~se

of

t~·nations

across

Americans who travel abroad usually begin their

journeys hy crossing the

~tlantic .

Fashions, architecture,

r outines of living in this nation all show strong influences from
the opposite side of the ocean .
11

We are, in short, preponderantly

Atlantic 11 by heredity, tradition, and proclivity .
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However, the authority as well as the territory of the
United States stops at the western edges of the ocean.

The

Atlantic has been a kind of sea barrier for us in the sense that
the Pacific has not been.

In the Pacific, not only do five states

reach the ocean, hut one of them- - Hawaii--literally emerges from
it.

In addition, we have territories of various sizes, shapes,

and legal relationships spread through its distant reaches.

The

Aleutian Islands which project towards the Soviet Union and Japan
are part of the State of Alaska.

American Samoa, Guam, Wake,

Johnston, Midway and the Howland, Baker and Jarvis Islands are
far-flung dependencies.

The Canton and Enderbury Islands are an

American - British condominium .

The Trust Territory of the Pacific

Islands has been administered by the United States since the end
of the Second World War; it comprises over 2,000 islands and atolls
which together total only 678 square miles of land but which are
dispersed over three million square miles of ocean .

World War II

left a provisional American administration in Ckinawa and the
other Ryukyu Islands; there it has remained for a quarter of a
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century

almost within sight of the Asian mainland.

More than

a frontier, more than an avenue of communication and trade, the
Pacif:c is a vast

~e - arena

within which lie states, territories,

and dependencies appertaining in large part to the United States .
I would like to make clear that in referring to the
Pacific, I do not include the Asian mainland or the waters
immediately adjacent.

On that mainland, ther e are no American

possessions but there are more American forces than anywhere else
in the world outside the United States.

Not only is there the

immense consignment in Viet Nam hut large American military contingents are also stationed in Thailand and South Korea .

For

the first time in history, we have deployed military power in
mass along the whole arc of the Asian mainland .
In this manner, almost without realizing it, we have
cast ourselves in the role of Asian power .

We have extended the

outposts of our Pacific power to China ' s borders.

We have done

so on the assumption that China is bent on military expansion

- 4 and that it is essential for the United States to contain that
expansion.

That we have erred in the form of our response,even

if the assumptions are accurate, is illustrated, in my judgment,
by the war in Viet Nam .
se~se .

The war has not contained China in any

Nor has it even decreased Chinese influence in Viet Nam.

If anything , it may be having the opposite effect .
What needs most to be learned from the tragic experience in Viet Nam is that there is no national interest of the
United States which requires us to perform the functions of an
Asian power .

On the contrary, it is as self-damaging as it is

futile to presume that that role can be exercised by an outs1.de
power anywhere on the Asian land-mass .

The fact is that the

nations of Asia are going to develop along economic and political
lines which are determined by themselves.

The development will

spring from their history, philosophy, and tradition.
be hased on their human and material resources .
the political realities of their surroundings .

It will

It will reflect

- 5 Nations outside the region, perhaps, can participate
economically in limited ways in this process, but they cannot
control the social evolution

o~

Asia .

What applies to other

outside nations applies to us. We have never been a part of the
Asi~n

continent .

We a re not now.

We will not be in the future .

However, we are a part of the Pacific, as I have
already observed, and we will continue to be.

Whether we will

remain a Pacific power is not in questton; we have no choice .
What is at issue is our future role with respect to Asia .

On

that score, it seems to me , the character of our commitment is
la r gely a matter of our choice.

We were not forced, for example,

· nto the present involvement in Viet Nam .

Largely by a pyramid -

ing of successive unilateral declarations and acts, the commitment was built to its great dimensions .

The choice was ours .

By the same token, this nation, through the President, still
retains, in my judgment, the capacity to increase, reduce, or
even to dismantle that commitment by its own calculated decisions .

- 6 Whatever else may prove true of our future role in
Asian affairs, I am persuaded that it will differ from the role
we have played in the past .

The postwar World War II era has

ended, whether or not we recognize it .

Whether or not we realize

it, we are in a period of transition in our relations with the
nations of the Western Pacific .

II

That such is the case is best illustrated by reference
to Japan .
quw~ent

Our relations with that nation have been relatively
for many years .

Time has brought changes in Japan which

have now reached a point just short of crisis .
The cloud on the horizon is the
treaty .

u.

s.-Japan security

Under the terms of the treaty, beginning in 1970 either

party may announce an intent to amend or terminate the agreement .
As this date has drawn closer, the political debate in Japan over

- 7 the treaty has grown in intensity.

It has centered on two

apecific points .
The first is the question of the American bases in
Japan-- number, location and use .

Among the Japanese, there has

been a growing resentment of these bases .

They are not uniformly

regarded as sources of a benevolent Ame r ican protection .

Often,

they are seen as symbols of excessive fo r eign influence as well
as hazardous nauisances .

Furthermor e, U. S. military airfields,

on occasion, act to disturb the populace , not only because they
occupy scarce land , but also because they pose dangers of acci dental explosions and crashes.

In the case of naval bases there

is, in Hiro&r.ma- conscious Japan, the additional concern with the
assumed danger of radiation whenever nuclear- powered U. S. vessels
call at these facilities .
The second specific issue around which the debate has
centered in Japan is the question of

tr~

Ryukyu

Isl~nds

(notably

Okinawa), which were an integral part of Japan before World War II

- 8 At the end of that conflict, the United States occupied these
islands and has since administered them through the Defense
Department .

The Japanese peace treaty of 195l , however, left

dangling, so to speak, certain matters pertaining to their final
disposition .

While the United States retained administrative

control, Japan was not required to relinquish sovereignty .
Moreover, this nation has since stated on more than one occasion
that there is no question that Japan possesses ''residual'' sovereignty over the Ryukyus .
Nevertheless, the United States has converted 0ki.nawa
into a great military depot .

Bases on the island are specifically

exempted from certain restrictions which are in effect on simjlar
U. S . installations in Japan proper .

In 1960 the United States

agreed that bases on the Japanese main islands cannot be used
for 'military combat operations'' without the agreement of the
Japanese government but by contrast the same inhibition is not
in effect in Okinawa which has served as a staging area for the

- 9 war in Viet Nam and for R- 52 bomher operations .
is a most fundamental difference:
nuclear

weap~ns

Finally~

ther e

we have agreed not to stor e

in Japan proper; there is no such agreement

respect:ng Okinawa .
The military hases relate to the larger issue of Japan's
future military r ole in the Pacific .

What is involved in this

question is the continuance of a situation in which the pr ima r y
responsihility for defending JapanJ and indeed the entire Wester n
Pacific ~

falls to the United States .

Over the

ye~rs~

of affairs has cost us untold billions of dollars .

this state

Its pe r sist-

ence is now heginning to appear somewhat anac r onistic a quar ter
of a century after Wo r ld War II and with a Japan that is the
third greatest industr ial powe r in the wor ld .
Many

J~panese

a r e restless under U. S. military sur-

veillance of their homeland and adjacent wate r s .

On the other

handJ there is also a conflicting factor of Japanese anxiety
that American military protection may he withdrawn .

nut of t he
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dichotomy has come a view that Japan should rearm

~eyond

the

modest ' self defense" forces which it possesses and assume a
part of the defense functions which are now heing discharged by
this nation .

The view has adherents not only in Japan but in

certain quarters in the United States .
All of the issues which I have discussed so far have
a significant characteristic in common :

they are military matters

There are , of course, also non- military matters in dispute between
Japan and the United States as , for example, certain barriers to
trade and investment .

The fact remains, nevertheless, that the

main source of friction in U. S. - Japanese relations, today, is
to be found in disagreement over military questions .

I emphasize

this point because there has been some tendency to avoid public
consideration of these matters in connection with foreign policy .
Yet, the questions are fundamental .

The future of the U.

s.-

Japanese relationship will be very shaky, indeed, if we proceed
to try to base it preponderantly on our military convenience in
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the Pacific , notwithstanding the

irr~tation

and hostility which

may be caused thereby in Japan .
It seems to me there is a need for great alertness to
changing Japanese attitudes respecting our military activities .
While some sentiment already exists in J1pan for the removal of
all U. S . military bases, I do not think that that is the dominant
view .

There is, rather , a general desire to see a reduction in

the number of U. s . bases in Japan .

A prompt response to this

desire, I believe, not only would meet Japanese wishes but would
also correspond to the interests of this nation .

Certainly, it

would dovetail with our present effort to reduce federal expendi tures and, in particular, expenditures abroad .

In my judgment,

it would also act, in timely fashion, to preserve an accommodat ing tone in

u.

s . - Japanese relations .

Indeed, I am persuaded that much of the growing controversy with Japan could be dispelled if it were simply stated
that we are prepared to abide by Japanese desires respecting the
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bases .

The installations are maintained at great cost to this

nation on the grounds of the contribution which they make to
Japanese security and, hence, indirectly to the security of the
United States.

If the hases have now ceased to have that function

in Japanese calculations , how can they possibly serve a useful
purpose in our s?

They become, in fact, a growing liahility if

they cause mounting friction between this nation and the Japanese
populace .
Whatever the sentiments on the question of American
bases in Japan, Okinawa is the looming issue in Japanese- American
relations .

It is the lightning rod, so to speak, which has

attracted most of the arguments , most of the protests , and most
of the attention .
There is strong and growing pressure within Japan and
Okinawa for the immediate repossession of full control over the
Ryukyus .

It seems to me that we have delayed a long time-- perhaps

too long--on this sensitive issue.

Okinawa is Japanese; we have

- 13 never claimed otherwise .

I see no just or

r~tional

alternative

other than to try to a rrive at a fixed time-schedule for the
progressive and prompt return of administrative control over the
Ryukyu Islands to Japan .

In restoring Japanese administrative

control over Okinawa, moreover, it seems to me that there are
also strong arguments against insisting on a ''deal' which will
permit the use of the military bases in ways which are not
acceptahle to the Japanese people .
There will be, I am sure, cries of anguish in some
quarters at any significant modification of our right to unrestricted use of Okinawa.

Nevertheless, entrenched parochial

interests cannot be permitted to prevail in this critical matter .
Okinawa is undoubtedly a great military convenience but it is by
no means indispensable .

The fact is that there have been enormous

technological developments in the military field since World \Alar
II .

We now have missiles which can carry nuclear weapons into

space.

We have planes which can carry them in the atmosphere

- 14 over the ocean .

We have ships which can carry them on the ocean,

and submarines which can carry them under the ocean .

We also

have other bases in the Pacific--bases which are under unchal lenged American sovereignty--where nuclear weapons can be stored
and where Strategic Air Command planes with nuclear weapons may
be based without question or complaint .
As I have already noted, the issues of the bases and
Okinawa relate to the larger question of Japan's future military
role .

Here, too, it seems to me, that a greater sensitivity to

Japanese popular sentiment is essential.

It would appear -..

particularly ill- advised for the United States to try to push
the Japanese towards a new and expanded military role in the
Western Pacific .

To be sure, the Japanese may one day raise the

present level of their self- defense forces .

They may even , one

day, amend their constitution in order to possess other than
self- defense forces .

Any such decisions, however, should result

from Japanese political pr ocesses which reflect Japanese judgments

- 15 of Japanese needs -- judgments for which the Japanese accept full
responsibility .

They should not result from American pressures

reflecting American judgments of American needs and, for which,
this nation in the end will have to hear responsibility .

III

If the Japanese do not assume the military burdens
which the U. S . would relinquish when the bases in Japan are
reduced in number and those on Okinawa are restricted in use,
some will ask :

who will defend the Pacific?

Presumably, it is

fear of China which gives rise to this question .

It does not

follow, however, if the Chinese are hound on expansion, that
they are capable of trans - Pacific aggression .

Indeed, President

Nixon has made it clear that he does not buy the contention of
some defense advisors that a "thin 1 anti - ballistics missiles
system is needed because of the Chinese threat .

- 16 A thrust of military power across the Pacific is quite
a different matter from expansion on the Asian continent.

Even

in the latter case there is a difference of view as to the nature
of Chinese continental pressure and what constitutes the principal
danger to orderly progress in Asia .

Among the nations of Southeas

Asia, for example, it is commonplace to find that the threat of
Chinese military aggression is rated a more remote menace than
the immediate problems of economic underdevelopment and political
instability which, in some cases, stem from internal economic
disparities and in others from conflicts between two or more
countries within the region .
These latter problems can hardly be met by U. S. defense
outposts in the Western Pacific .

Rather, their solution requires

cooperation for constructive purposes among the Southeast Asian
nations and with other nations outside the region .
cooperation has begun and it is taking two forms .

In fact, such
First, there

are groups of states within the region, such as the newly formed

- 17 Association of Southeast Asian Nations .

Second, there are

regional organizations with outside members, such as the Asian
Development Bank .

The Bank includes European and North American

subscribers whose modern resources can play an important , if
peripheral, part in the progress of the Asian nations .
In this connection, there seems to me to be consider able
merit in Japanese suggestions that the United States, Canada,
Australia, New Zealand, and Japan should form a "Pacific community
to help developing countries .

I should add, that in a grouping

of this kind, Japan can play a most significant part .

Indeed,

in my judgment, it is in the sphere of economic development
wherein lies Japan's principal potential for a contribution to
the peace and progress of the Western Pacific.

IV

I have talked of several facets of the situation in an
effort to place the needs of our Asian policies in clearer perspective ; of the distinction between a

~cific

power which we have

- 18 and
no choice but to be jan Asian power which
not to be, of our military

relati~ns

\lie

can and should choose

with Japan and the heat which

is rising from the issues of the bases, Okinawa, and the over- all
Japanese role in the security of the Western Pacific; and, finally,
of economic development in the Asian countries and the possibilitir
of cooperative aid .

There are several other related questions

which need to be touched on to complete this discussion .

One

concerns our relations with mainland China .
Strictly speaking, Chi na is not of the Pacific but of
Asia .

Yet, the very vastness of China projects its relevance

not only over the Asian mainland and the Pacific but, in fact,
throughout the entire world .

It is not possible to talk about

the future of international peace, let alone about our future
in the Pacific, without reference to the great nation which
lies on its farther shore .

- 19 China will not remain forever, as is now the case, in
substantial isolation .

Its proper role is as a leading nation

in the councils of the world .
that place.

Sooner or later China will assume

It seems to me the Japanese have long since come to

recognize that prospect .

And ther e are indications that they are

seeking to bridge the gap with China .

Even if we could, there is

no cause for this nation to impose obstacles of any kind - -either
spoken or unspoken-- to increasing Japanese contacts with China .
On the contrary, such efforts -- whether in the economic , cultural,
or political fields - -might well be encouraged.

They can serve

not only Japan's needs for trade, they can contribute to clearing
up a whole range of enigmas involving China and the security of
the Western Pacific.

In that fashion, they can be helpful in

bringing about an enlightened approach to the building of a stable
peace in that region.
For our part, and for much the same reasons, I see no
purpose in imposing any special restrictjons on the travel of
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Americans to China.

Nor do I see any reason not to place trade

with China in non- strategic goods on the same basis as trade with
the Soviet Union, Poland, and other Communist countries.

For a

decade and a half we have sought to maintain a rigid primary and
secondary boycott of Chinese goods.

The effort is unique in our

history and it finds no parallel among the present practices of
other nations with respect to China .

In my view, we would be

well advised to abandon this antiquated pursuit of China's downfall by economic warfare and treat with the Chinese in matters of
trade as we treat with European Communist countries-- no better
and no worse .
It seems to me, the Nixon Administration's announced
intention to reopen previous offers to exchange journalists,
scientists , and scholars with China is well founded .

The cancel -

lation of the meeting in Warsaw on February 20, at which these
offers were to be reiterated , is regrettable.

One can only hope

that another opportunity will soon present itself and, hopefully,
that the official offers will be made and accepted .
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Trade, travel, and cultural and scientific exchanges are
relatively tangible issues in our relationship with China .

Hence,

they seem to be more readily amenable to solution; perhaps, that
is why current discussion of the relationship with China tends to
concentrate on them .

Similarly, the present debate is intensive

on the questions of Chinese admission to the United Nations and
U. S. diplomatic recognition of Peking .
susceptible to clear solution.
of the difficulties .

These issues, too, seem

They are not , however, at the root

To try to resolve them at this point may be

a useful intellectual exercise but it also tends to put the cart
of the difficulty before the horse .
The fundamental problem of U. S. - Chinese relations is
the status of Taiwan .
is crucial .

It is a problem which is as complex as it

It is not an either- or issue .

soluble, in an enduring sense, in

~erms

It is not really

of two Chinas·as has·been

suggested in recent years because there are not two Chinas and
the attempt to delineate them is synthetic .

The fact is that
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China is a part of Taiwan and Taiwan is a part of China .

Both

Chinese governments which are agreed on little else are agreed
on that score.

The question is not whether the twain shall meet

but when and in what circumstances .

While we are not aloof from

this question, the decisions which appertain thereto involve
primarily the Chinese themselves- - the Chinese of the mainland
and the Chinese of Taiwan.

Sooner or later the decisions will

have to begin to be made .

Only then will the other part of the

Chinese puzzle-- such questions as U. S . recognition and U. N.
admission--fall into a rational place in our policies .

v
While I have spoken today principally about the United
States, Japan, and China , two other major nations are of
immediate concern .
Philippines and to Indonesia.

I refer to the

Re~ublic

of the

- 23 There are signs of difficulties in our relat·ons with
the Philippines, principally in the field of trade and investment
and with respect to U. S . military bases .

In my judgment, however,

none of the problems which confront us is of a nature as to be
beyond reasonable solution in the light of the general cooperation
which we have long enjoyed with the Philippines .

Yet it is pre-

cisely this basic cooperation which seems to me now to be in
jeopardy.

It is adversely affected by a vestigUQ tendency- - a

hang-over from pre-independence days -- to continue to think almost
automatically in terms of special economic privileges and concessions.

Similarly in the field of foreign relations there is an

inclination to expect that the policy of the Philippines government, inevitably, will mirror our own attitudes .

Therefore, such

departures as the recent Philippine initiation of contact with
Communist countries seems somehow inimical to continued warm
U. S .- Philippines relations .

That istronic inasmuch as we have

lnng since had contact with most of these countries .

- 24 It is not a law of nature- -it is an Aesopian fable-that familiarity must always breed contempt .

A half century of

familiarity which was crowned with the common sacrifices of World
War II laid the basis not for a mutual contempt but for an enduring friendship between the Filipino and American people .

It

seems to me that we need to bestir ourselves now if this mutually
valuable tie ts not to be lost.

Indeed, it would be my hope that

the new Administration would give prompt attention to this matter.
To allow barriers of estrangement to be raised, by
negligence or nonsense, is to admit a serious disability in our
capacity to order our relations with other countries, notably
those which have gained independence since World War II.

After

all, if we cannot hold the c0nfidence, the friendship, and the
respect of a people with whom we have been intimately associated
for half- a - century, what can be expected with regard to other
nations in Asia with which we have had little or no historic
connection?

- 25 Indonesia is one such nation.

Formerly the Dutch East

Indies, this immense island chain was largely unknown to Americans
during the colonial era.

In the post-independence period, there

has been a considerable contact but it has been uneven and unpredictable .

In recent years, there has been a deterioration which,

at times, has reached almost the point of outright mutual hostility.
The pendulum apparently is now swinging and hope exists once again
for a more agreeable situation .
It will take time,

h~wever,

for us to form a balanced

view of this enormous island- nation which in terms of population
is the sixth largest in the world.

It will take time , too, for

Indonesia to emerge from its accumulated political and economic
ills.

The burden of the past is heavy and pervasive .
The United States can do little to speed up the develop-

ment of a better association with Indonesia .

Indeed in present

circumstances the best policy is to accept our own limitations
in this regard.

To be sure, there are the gestures of goodwill

- 26which can be made in the form of technical, scientific, and
educational cooperation.

Moreover, through regional aid channels,

such as I have already discussed, some assistance can be provided
to Indonesia for economic development.

That is a far cry, however,

from self- delusive assumptions that by sending Americans to fight
in Viet Nam we have somehow saved Indonesia from Communism or
that the astute efforts of U. S. agencies and enough money in
some miraculous fashion can act to delineate the emerging structure of the Indonesian nation .

VII

Having described the problems which confront the Unjted
States in the Pacific, I feel that I have an obligation to
with a few general words of prescription .

cl~se

Almost fifty years of

association with the Pacific- - as a student, Marine, teacher, and
frequent visitor-- prompt me to do so.

A quarter of a century of

political experience, on the other hand, impel me in the other
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direction .

In these years of specializing in foreign relations

both in the House of Representatives and in the Senate I have
come to recognize the general absence of finality in the disposi tion of major international problems .
Nevertheless, I did remark at the outset that whatever
our future in the Pacific, that futu r e will be unlike the past .
I am now under

s~me

compulsion to fill in details which sustain

the general observation .

The most fundamental new factor in the

situation, as I see it, is the appearance of at least one new
generation since my generation began to grapple with the postWorld War II Asian situation and, in particular and with a
singular lack of effectiveness, with the monumental upheaval of
the Chinese revolution .
for the future .

This new generation is a source of hope

It is a hope which derives largely

fr~m

the

interest young people now take in the affairs of the other side
of the Pacific.

That interest is more profound and far better

informed than was the case t\-10 decades or more ago .
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It used to be that in an ' Atlantic-minded ' nation the
consideration of Asian questions was left la r gely to a relative
handful of Americans, to "old Asian" or ' old China hands, ' whose
attitudes were churned out of a mixture of 19th century religious
altruism, political idealism, cold-cash imperialism, and unscrupulous adventurism .

World War II altered this mixture; the Korean

War modified it further; and now Viet Nam has changed it greatly.
The attitudes which once held sway in this nation with respect to
our relations with Asia and the Pacific have lost most of their
relevance and much of their potency.
If there is to be a worthwhile future in the Pacific,
it seems to me that U. S . policies for the problems of the Asian
littoral will not be left in "old Asian hands. "

Rather they will

take on the sense and sensitivity of "young American hands."
problems will be dealt with in a new spirit of

cooperati~n

The

and

collaboration, free of attitudes of dominance or condescension .
The keynote of a new policy for contemporary Asia, as I see it,

- 29 is mutuality.

Its characteristics will be mutual respect, mutual

appreciation, and mutual forebearance .
For us there is no choice .

We must make the effort to

put our policies into that perspective .
tinue to live in the Pacific, \'le

wi

We will not only con-

11 also have to learn to live

with the Pacific and the nations of tts western reaches, basing
our relations with its peoples- - with the Chinese , Japanese,
Filipinos, Koreans, Indonesians , and others-- henceforth, on
a profound respect for the equal dignity and worth of all .

